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9.  The global diffusion of U.S. legal
thought: changing influence, national
security and legal education in crisis
Fernanda Nicola
Law is spread as much by literature as by legislation. Commerce, education 
and religion may be as important conduits as governmental action in bringing 
about legal change.1
I.  LEGAL DIFFUSION AND MULTIDIRECTIONAL
WINDS
During the twentieth century, the center of production of legal ideas shifted 
from France to Germany and then to the United States. Here, the dominant 
legal reasoning framed the law as a phenomenon of social organization that 
was not confined to a specific legal system.2 There were both external and 
internal factors influencing U.S. legal thought which explain this change of 
wind from continental Europe to the United States. Externally, after World 
War II the United States garnered influence by positioning itself for political 
and economic global leadership. Internally, the critique of social purpose 
functionalism articulated by the legal realists provided new problem-solving 
approaches integrated in a reconstructive and pragmatic understanding 
of law called positive-sociology functionalism.3 Finally, legal diffusion 
occurred through public law disciplines based on U.S. constitutional law 
theories of rights, neo-formalism, and balancing conflicting policy analysis.4
1 See William Twining (2006), “Diffusion of law: A global perspective”, J. 
Comp. L., 1, 237, 238.
2 See Ugo Mattei (1993), “Why the wind changed: Intellectual leadership in 
western law”, Am. J. Comp. L., 42, 195, 195–96.
3 See Fernanda Nicola (2010), “Family law exceptionalism in comparative 
law”, Am. J. Comp. L., 58, 777, 795.
4 See Duncan Kennedy (2006), The Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in 
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The diffusion of legal education takes place through law schools, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and other avenues, and with different political agendas, often in con-
junction, for instance, with law and development reforms or more broadly 
due to the prestige of U.S. legal training and academia.5 U.S. legal thought 
reached Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa through the transplant 
of legal institutions. The diffusion of U.S. legal styles often changed the 
process rather than the content of legal education, which resulted in local 
curriculum reforms that reflected the more pragmatic U.S. education style.6 
Some scholars have harshly criticized the export of U.S. legal thought for its 
distinct adversarial judicial process that decentralizes power and privatizes 
disputes while creating advantages for the powerful and wealthy, expanding 
inequality and social stratification.7 Others have instead claimed that the 
diffusion of teaching methods geared to the adoption of U.S.-based clinical 
legal education aims at informing, adapting, and promoting social justice 
in a way that addresses the contextual realities of the importing country.8
A. Legal Diffusion through Legal Education
Since the beginning of the twentieth century the United States has been 
a successful recipient of European legal ideas.9 However, by the end of 
World War II, the direction changed as the United States became a major 
center of production of the global legal consciousness, or the langue, used 
by transnational legal elites.10 In the post-war era, law schools played an 
important role in the diffusion of U.S. legal thought around the world 
often driven by law and development goals.11 Cosmopolitan law schools 
A Critical Appraisal, pp. 19, 57 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University 
Press).
5 See Michele Graziadei (2009), “Legal transplants and the frontiers of legal 
knowledge”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 10, 723, 724.
6 See William Twining (2005), “Social science and diffusion of law”, J.L. 
Soc’y, 32, 203, 204; John H. Merryman (2000), “Law and development memoirs: 
The Chile Law Program”, Am. J. Comp. Law, 48, 481, 484.
7 See Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader (2008), Plunder: When the Rule of Law Is 
Illegal (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons).
8 See Richard Wilson (2012), “Clinical legal education in Latin America”, 
symposium hosted by the Drexel Law Review, 12 October.
9 See Mattei (n 2), at 195–96.
10 See Kennedy (n 4), at 57.
11 See Mark Galantier and David Trubek (1974), “Scholars in self-estrange-
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in North America received many Jewish émigré law professors who 
maintained their European ties after the war. U.S. law schools developed 
graduate programs initially influenced by European doctoral models, but 
later on switched gears to influence legal elites around the globe.12 In past 
decades, graduate programs in North America educated lawyers who 
became part of global legal and political elites working in transnational 
firms or international organizations.13 U.S.-based academics increasingly 
served as legal advisors to draft, interpret, and reform the constitutions of 
countries in transition, or to lead neoliberal market reforms legitimized by 
the Washington consensus ideology in allegedly corrupt governments in 
need of constant legal reform.14 In either case, U.S. law schools and their 
professors became important agents of legal change exporting either the 
mainstream or the critiques to U.S. legal thought to the rest of the world.15
Even though the diffusion of U.S. legal education has been studied more 
systematically by social scientists than lawyers, lawyers remain central 
agents of legal change.16 Positivists’ accounts of law and development 
have addressed the reforms in legal institutions rather than the change 
in legal reasoning and culture of the receiving groups. Critical scholars, 
however, have shown resistance to legal transplants when the transfer of 
foreign legal doctrines might create irritation in the receiving system, when 
the transfer only partially penetrates depending on the commitment to its 
adoption by legal and political elites,17 or when the transfer is accepted, 
albeit with continuous suspicion, by post-colonial elites shifting from the 
reception of European to U.S. legal thought.18
The difficulty in mapping the diffusion of U.S. legal thought, rather 
than the reception of a particular institution or a judicial/legislative rule, is 
12 See Gail Hupper (2007), “The rise of an academic doctorate in law: Origins 
through World War II”, Am. J. Legal Hist., 49 (1), 1.
13 See Yvez Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth (2012), Lawyers and the Construction 
of Transnational Justice (Abingdon/New York: Routledge).
14 See Jorge Esquirol (2008), “The failed law in Latin America”, Am. J. Comp. 
L., 56, 75; Noah Feldman (2005), “Imposed constitutionalism”, Conn. L. Rev., 37, 
857, 860.
15 See Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds) (2002), Left Legalism/Left 
Critique (Durham: Duke University Press), p. 10.
16 See Twining (n 6), at 204.
17 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), 
“The transplant effect”, Am. J. Comp. L., 51, 163–203.
18 See Sylvia Wairimu Kang‘ara (2012), “Beyond bed and bread: Making the 
African state through marriage reform-constitutive and transformative influences 
of Anglo-American legal thought”, Hastings Race & Poverty L.J., 9, 353; Gunther 
Teubner (1998), “Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or how unifying law 
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how to measure the influence of U.S. legal ideas in another country’s legal 
reasoning style. Legal education is an excellent starting point because law 
schools provide the necessary training which every lawyer must undertake. 
Since the 1990s, U.S. law schools have developed graduate programs 
including masters or doctorates in law that have educated professors in 
Canada, Israel, Korea, Colombia, and Taiwan.19
The prestige of U.S. legal education went hand in hand with the pre-
dominance of Western legal ideas such as the promotion of democracy 
and the rule of law. For instance, China’s increasing geopolitical power 
and economic performance in the last twenty years led to dramatic 
changes in its traditional and post-communist legal system slowly com-
mitting to introduce Western rule of law principles.20 The prestige of being 
involved in institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), as 
well as maintaining the prized most favored nation trade status, nudged 
China towards reforming its legal system in a way that was more in line 
with Western principles, at least on the surface.21 Legal change in China 
was prompted also by the dramatic expansion of its legal education. 
Universities in the United States are the sites where many Chinese legal 
scholars regularly visit through U.S. legal assistance programs and funds 
for cooperation.22 U.S. law literature is ample in law libraries of Chinese 
universities and the highest numbers of citations of foreign literature 
are directed to American scholarly works, cases and legislation. Chinese 
scholars are familiar with many law terms which originated from or were 
affected by U.S. law, such as: administrative regulations and deregulation, 
public choice and game theory, disclosure of government information and 
certainly the due process principle and hearings.23 Increasingly, China’s 
lower court judges are experimenting with plea bargaining, using informal 
precedent, and hearing an increasing number of rights-based claims.24
19 See Gail Hupper (2008), “The academic doctorate in law: A vehicle for 
legal transplants?”, J. L. Educ., 58, 413, 415.
20 See William Alford (2000), “Exporting “the Pursuit of Happiness” Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve by Thomas Carothers (book review)”, 
Harv. L. Rev., 113, 1677, 1683.
21 See Donald S. Clarke (2003), “China’s legal system and the WTO: 
Prospects for compliance”, Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., 2, 97.
22 See Jacques DeLisle (1999), “Lex Americana? United States legal assis-
tance, American legal models, and legal change in the post-communist world and 
beyond”, U Pa. J. Int. L., 20, 179, 180.
23 See Haibo He (2008), “The dawn of the due process principle in China”, 
Colum. J. Asian L., 22, 57. 
24 See Benjamin L. Liebman (2008), “China’s courts: Restricted reform”, 
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By focusing on the legal diffusion of U.S. legal thought through legal 
education, this chapter aims to go beyond the binary interaction between 
borrower and lender in a fixed direction. Rather than a wind going in a 
unilateral direction replacing another one, legal diffusion should be under-
stood as a multidirectional change in winds pointing to an overlap of legal 
practices in which one becomes predominant at a certain point and time in 
legal education without substituting the other.25
B. Signs of the Waning Influence of U.S. Legal Thought
The emerging influence of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) over international trade and their convergence on govern-
ance models has created resistance and counter-harmonization processes 
to U.S. foreign trade hegemony,26 especially with the erratic trade policy 
in the Trump era. In testing the limits of the diffusion of U.S. legal 
thought around the world – from public to private law – U.S. legal 
doctrines, ideas, and policies appear as retro rather than avant-garde 
compared to emerging global models. For instance, South African trans-
formative constitutional law principles embedded in its Constitution of 
1996 have allowed the South African Constitutional Court to engage 
in a comparative constitutional discourse that has become a model in 
a diverse number of legal subjects, from socio-economic rights to same 
sex marriage.27 In a similar way Brazilian trade strategies within the 
multilateral forum of the WTO have carved their own policy autonomy 
in order to challenge issues such as exchange rate misalignments through 
antidumping measures.28
The successful advancement of U.S. legal ideas after World War II 
25 See Twining (n 1), at 238.
26 See Lucia Scaffardi (2013), “BRICS a multi-centre ‘legal network’?”, 
Beijing L. Rev., 5, 140–48; Amy Kapczynski (2009), “Harmonization and its 
discontents: A case study of TRIPS implementation in India’s pharmaceutical 
sector”, Calif. L. Rev., 97, 1571, 1576.
27 See Macarena Saez (2015), “Which side of the aisle? The coming divide 
between marriage and family law” “Transforming family law through same-sex 
marriage: Lessons from (and to) the western world”, Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L., 25, 
125; Karl E. Klare (1998), “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism”, 
SALJ on Human Rights, 14, 146.
28 See Alvaro Santos (2012), “Carving out policy autonomy for developing 
countries in the World Trade Organization: The experience of Brazil and Mexico”, 
Va. J. Int’l L., 52, 551, 553; see also Vera Thorstensen, Emerson Marçal and Lucas 
Ferraz (2012), “Exchange rate misalignments and international trade policy: 
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went hand in hand with neoliberal policies that were promoted globally by 
the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. From the mid-1990s until 2005, 
neoliberalism was waning as a result of disappointment with the neoliberal 
market shock therapy in Russia and Latin American and opposition to 
structural adjustment policies across the Global South. This changed law 
and development strategies to include civil society as well as human and 
social goals in the post-neoliberal development agenda.29 The rising legal 
and political elites from the peripheries and semi-peripheries of China, 
Africa, and Latin America were moving from straightforward neolib-
eral economic recipes and rights-based approaches to a more selective 
 reception of U.S. legal thought.
The gap created by the demise of the Washington Consensus allowed 
both Left and Right to experiment with their approaches to economic 
development. Both approaches, recently revamped by the populist agendas 
of Maduro, Orban and even Trump, include attention to localism, paying 
respect to differing capabilities, and tailoring reforms to the context in 
which they take place depending on local elites and social recipients.30 
Although legal realism, legal process, and rights neo-formalist insights 
of U.S. legal thought were successfully globalized elsewhere, these no 
longer satisfied the needs of rising legal elites from the Global South, the 
semi-peripheries of China, Africa and Latin America who were seeking to 
integrate global and native styles, and even more recently the Brexit and 
Trump supporters who felt left out from economic globalization and the 
rise of neoliberalism.31
C. The Decline of One Kind of U.S. Constitutionalism
During the 1980s, the diffusion of U.S. legal thought went hand in hand 
with neoliberal policies not only in law and development circles, but also 
in private and regulatory law circles in the European Union (EU). The dif-
fusion of U.S. mainstream law and economics was central to the engineers 
of the internal market in Europe reforming product liability law.32
29 See David Kennedy (2006), “The ‘Rule of Law’, political choices, and 
development common sense”, in Trubek and Santos (n 4).
30 See Amartya Sen (2009), The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press).
31 Duncan Kennedy (2017), “A left of liberal interpretation of Trump’s ‘big’ 
win, Part One: Neoliberalism”, Nev. L.J. Forum, 1, 98.
32 See Daniela Caruso and Roberto Pardolesi (2012), “Per una storia della 
direttiva sulla responsibilitia da prodotto difettoso”, Danno e Responsabilta, 9 
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U.S. law and economics was appealing to European elites for its 
combination of rights neo-formalist approaches and analytics bor-
rowed from neoliberal economics. The idea of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency 
provided a target not only for legislatures, but also for judges driven 
by economic efficiency rationales.33 With the increasing political and 
legal divide across the Atlantic marked by the Iraq war and other 
regulatory conflicts over privacy protection, Right v. Left approaches 
to U.S. law and economics were no longer taken at face value. Instead, 
for European private lawyers, the selective reception of U.S. law and 
economics  became part of their strategies in relation to European 
integration.34
Praise for U.S. constitutional law by its liberal and cosmopolitan elites 
appears in decline. For example, sounding almost defeated, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter stated that “[o]ne of our great exports used to be constitutional 
law.”35 According to Harold Hongju Koh, today foreign courts in well-
established democracies prefer to cite the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights in cases concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions 
against cruel treatment, rather than U.S. case law. This downturn in U.S. 
dominance is often explained as a result of the increasing sophistication of 
transnational elites all over the world. Additionally, these courts appear 
more liberal than their U.S. counterparts. As journalist Adam Liptak 
noted, “American ideas are for export, and there’s very little effort in the 
U.S. legal system to import ideas.” In this respect, the Scalia-Breyer debate 
in the United States illustrates the difficulty in importing liberal legal ideas 
into U.S. constitutional law when justices are profoundly divided over 
the use of comparative law in constitutional adjudication.36 Perhaps more 
important to the lessening impact of U.S. jurisprudence is “the adamant 
opposition of some Supreme Court justices to the citation of foreign law in 
33 Duncan Kennedy (1998), “Law and economics from a critical legal studies 
perspective”, in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law (London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan/Stockton Press).
34 See Fernanda Nicola (2008), “Transatlanticisms: Constitutional asym-
metry and selective reception of U.S. law and economics in the formation of 
European private law”, Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L., 16, 101; James Q. Whitman 
(2004), “Two western cultures of privacy: Dignity versus liberty”, Yale L.J., 113, 
1151, 1156.
35 See Adam Liptak (2008), “U.S. Court is now guiding fewer nations”, The 
New York Times, 17 September, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/
us/18legal.html? r50 (accessed 14 September 2017).
36 See Sujit Choudry (2006), “Migration as a new metaphor in comparative 
constitutional law”, in Sujit Choudry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
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their own opinions.”37 For example, Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Aharon Barak has publically stated that the U.S. Supreme Court “is 
losing the central role it once had among courts in modern democracies”.38 
Meanwhile, even American Supreme Court justices have noticed the 
chilling effect that isolationist judicial thought can create. For example, 
Justice Ginsburg noted, “the failure to engage foreign decisions had 
resulted in diminished influence for the United States Supreme Court.” 
The Canadian Supreme Court, she said, is “probably cited more widely 
abroad than the U.S. Supreme Court.” There is one reason for that, she 
said: “You will not be listened to if you don’t listen to others.”39 Foreign 
Supreme Courts could be looking less at U.S. courts due to the reputation 
of their government abroad as a result of an imperialist foreign policy. In 
a similar vein, other constitutional courts will position themselves at the 
opposite side of the legal spectrum than the U.S. Supreme Court in an 
attempt to broadly reject a Western individualist notion of rights, like in 
the case of the Plurinational Constitutional Court in Bolivia.40
An empirical finding about such attitudes can be found in a David S. 
Law and Mila Versteeg article showing how in the last couple of decades 
a large number of countries explicitly refused to borrow or transplant 
from the U.S. constitutional arrangement and its rights-related provi-
sions.41 Through sixty years of comprehensive data on the content of the 
world’s constitutions, the authors reveal that there is a generic compo-
nent to global constitutionalism characterized by rights and institutional 
arrangements that appear in nearly all formal constitutions. Their general 
thesis, however, is that such a global constitutional toolkit is no longer 
influenced by U.S. constitutionalism and we are witnessing the end of 
an American hegemony. In recognizing that the U.S. constitution might 
have lost its appeal as a model to inspire constitutions in other countries, 
the authors go even further. They explain that the study of U.S legal 
culture aims to avoid mistakes like the ones incurred in American juris-
prudence. At times, U.S. law can become the anti-model. For instance, 
India’s Constitution drafters specifically rejected importing American 
37 See Liptak (n 35).
38 See Aharon Barak (2002), “A judge on judging: The role of a supreme court 
in a democracy”, Harv. L. Rev., 116, 19.
39 See Liptak (n 35).
40 See Diego Eduardo Lopez-Medina (2013), “Rights discourse and theory in 
the new plurinational constitutional court of Bolivia” at Harvard Law School in 
the IGLP program on comparative law (June).
41 See David S. Law and Mila Versteeg (2012), “The declining influence of the 
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due process  jurisprudence to avoid the consequences of the Lochner 
case.42 In a similar way, the drafters of the South African abortion legis-
lation were indirectly influenced by the U.S. experience in the aftermath 
of Roe v. Wade.43 On the other hand, the fact that the negative model is 
something that scholars and lawyers would want to study and under-
stand, but not necessary adopt, shows that the U.S. remains an influential 
cultural model.44
II. LEGAL DIFFUSION UNDER NEW CLOTHES
Legal scholars have suggested that the global diffusion of U.S. con-
stitutional law and the discipline of comparative constitutional law 
appear in decline.45 This chapter posits that what is changing is not the 
preeminence of U.S. legal thought around the globe but its means of dif-
fusion. Rather than under the guise of comparative constitutional law, 
legal scholars have engaged in the diffusion of U.S. national security 
law post 9/11.46 National security lawyers have carved an independent 
doctrinal canon and an analytical skillset for global professionals that 
are readily exportable. Rather than promoting global justice and critical 
thinking, under the attacks of legal reformers U.S. legal academia is 
turning inwards to training lawyers for Bar passage and local business 
transactions.
A. The Rise of National Security Law
The declining influence of comparative constitutional law (CCL) in U.S. 
legal academia has provided the opportunity for national security law 
42 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Heinz Klug (2000), “Model 
and anti-model: The United States Constitution and the ‘rise of world constitu-
tionalism’”, Wis. L. Rev., 3, 597, 606.
43 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. See Rachel Rebouche (2011), “The limits of 
reproductive rights in improving women’s health”, Ala. L. Rev., 63, 1.
44 See Kim Lane Scheppele (2003), “Aspirational and aversive constitu-
tionalism: The case for studying cross- constitutional influence through negative 
models”, Int’l J. Const. L., 1, 296, 297.
45 See David Fontana (2011), “The rise and fall of comparative constitutional 
law in the post-war era”, Yale J. Int’l L., 36, 1.
46 See Kim Lane Scheppelle (2006), “The migration of anti-constitutional 
ideas: the post-9/11 globalization of public law and the international state of emer-
gency”, in Sujit Choudry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge/
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(NSL) to play a leading role in U.S. law schools’ curriculum.47 In the past 
decades, many American law schools have replaced CCL and interna-
tional law classes with courses on NSL and U.S. foreign relations.48
The internal mode of diffusion of CCL was grounded in two dimensions 
based on U.S. constitutional thinking: a formalist and a functionalist 
one. The formalist dimension relied on a universalist and rights-based 
approach to fundamental rights, whereas the functionalist dimension 
addressed the structure of government, which reflected on how federal-
ism should deal with social tensions in balancing individual freedoms and 
socio-economic benefits.49
In contrast, the mode of diffusion of NSL has a formalist dimension 
based on habeas corpus rights and the distinction between citizens and 
aliens as well as civilian law versus laws of war. In its functionalist dimen-
sion, NSL scholarship balances state security with the privacy and civil 
liberties of targeted individuals.50
Despite the structural parallels between the CCL and NSL, there are 
some differences due to the formation and the politics of the different legal 
elites. U.S. lawyers and academics involved in NSL are no longer part of 
a cosmopolitan liberal elite, but they are criminal lawyers, immigration 
lawyers, or international and foreign relations lawyers committed to 
studying counter-terrorism and military commissions. The mode of diffu-
sion is no longer a discourse among constitutional or supranational courts 
from different countries or regions of the world, but the study of national 
executives and their relation to federal/military courts.51
B. From Crisis to the Changes in U.S. Legal Education
U.S. legal education is in the midst of a “crisis,” for lack of a better term, 
based on the financial crisis: skyrocketing student debt, in part financed 
by the government, the downturn in law school applications, and the 
47 See William C. Banks (2005), “Teaching and learning about terrorism”, J. 
Legal Educ., 55, 35.
48 See Michael J. Glennon (2005), “Teaching national security law”, J. Legal 
Educ., 55, 49.
49 See Kennedy (n 4), at 57.
50 See Mathew C. Waxman (2012), “National security federalism in the age of 
terror”, Stan. L. Rev., 64, 289, 290.
51 See Richard H. Fallon Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer (2007), “Habeas corpus 
jurisdiction, substantive rights, and the War on Terror”, Harv. L. Rev., 120, 2029, 
2037; Anne-Marie Slaughter (2005), A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press); James E. Pfander (2004), “Article I tribunals, Article III courts, 
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high unemployment rates for lawyers. One approach to solving the crisis, 
which is supported by scholars and practitioners, aims at transforming 
U.S. law schools from intellectual global hubs into localized training 
schools for lawyers proposing to shift from a three- to two-year JD (Juris 
Doctor) program and to open pro bono practice firms in law schools. Due 
to a sharp decrease in student enrollment, U.S. law schools are cutting 
resources for their international programs to strengthen local practice 
and Bar passage. Many predict a long-term crisis for law schools spurred 
in part by the global financial crisis, the high legal unemployment rate, 
and the skyrocketing debts carried by students in legal education. It is too 
early, however, to determine the real consequences of the current crisis 
in legal education ranging from structural changes in the employment 
market for lawyers to the lavish expenditures of law schools in fancy build-
ings and high faculty salaries.52 Yet this second more simplistic narrative 
appears to have more traction by severely impacting law schools’ reputa-
tions and allowing quick-fix solutions that might have a disastrous impact 
on the long-term intellectual output of law schools.
The reformist approach to such crisis aims at transforming U.S. law 
schools from intellectual global hubs into localized, low-cost training 
schools for transactional lawyers driven by Bar passage.53 Reformists 
promote the privatization of legal education, transforming the nature of 
U.S. law schools with changes such as: deregulating law schools, eliminat-
ing expensive clinical or outward-looking legal training, and favoring the 
on-going attempts by the American Bar Association to eliminate profes-
sorial tenure.54 As a result, the diffusion of U.S. legal consciousness will 
increasingly take place beyond U.S. law schools, often under the auspices 
of U.S. legal education abroad. What changes is the vehicle of legal 
 diffusion rather than its message.
Legal reformers attacking U.S. legal education are pushing for privati-
zation through the emergency of student debt and a critique of interdisci-
plinary and theoretical scholarship not geared to form local lawyers.55 In 
offering such an inward-looking solution of legal education curriculum, 
legal reformers are missing the point for many reasons.
Foremost, it is not clear that the recipe offered by legal reformers 
to transform the legal curriculum through privatizing law schools will 
52 Brian Z. Tamanaha (2012), Failing Law Schools (Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press).
53 Paul Campos (2012), “The crisis of the American law school”, University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 46 (1), 177–224.
54 Tamanaha (n 52).




The global diffusion of U.S. legal thought 251
improve the job opportunities of their students.56 On the contrary, 
empirical studies have shown that after obtaining law degrees, students 
have a median increase of income earnings that varies according to various 
historical factors.57 In addition, empirical studies have disproven the so-
called “buyers’ remorse” among law graduates, which reformers connect 
to student debt from law school.58
Additionally, the actual crisis of legal education ought to be understood 
in its historical perspective and narrowed to the job crisis of an elite Bar 
while many legal services to the poor or the middle class are still in demand 
and overpriced. Through a historical analysis of various legal crises over 
time, scholars have shown how the legal profession tends to adapt to new 
market needs.59
Lastly, legal reformers claim that law students are failed by law schools 
that use their resources to advance legal scholarship rather than to teach 
legal skills, and propose to shorten the time of law school education 
from three to two years.60 Not only have many studies shown that the 
correlation between failing law students and legal scholarship is largely 
flawed and unproven, but its result would dramatically alter the nature 
of U.S. law schools at home and abroad as sites offering critical think-
ing and social justice visions to young lawyers.61 An example at the local 
level is what Jamie Raskin has undertaken at the Washington College of 
Law, and law schools around the country, with the Marshall Brennan 
Constitutional Literacy Project. This bottom-up and outward-looking 
training strategy aims to engage law students to raise the consciousness of 
young students in local public high schools as a form of “popular constitu-
tionalism in action”.62 At the global level, U.S. law schools have emerged 
56 See Jennifer S. Bard ((2012), “Failing law schools”, J. Legal Educ., 33, 417, 420.
57 Michael Simkovic, and Frank McIntyre (2013), “The economic value of 
a law degree”, American law and economics conference, 18 May. See also Frank 
McIntyre and Michael Simkovic (2014), “The economic value of a law degree”, J. 
Legal Stud., 43, 249.
58 See Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, and Joyce Sterling (2013), “Buyers’ 
remorse? An empirical assessment of the desirability of a legal career”, J. Legal 
Educ., 63, 211, 212.
59 See Bryant Garth (2013), “Crises, crisis rhetoric, and competition in legal 
education: A sociological perspective on the (latest) crisis of the legal profession 
and legal education”, Stan. L & Pol’y Rev., 24, 503, 504.
60 See Brian Z. Tamanaha (2006), Failing Law School (Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press).
61 See Bard (n 56), at 420.
62 See Jamie B. Raskin (2013), “The Marshall-Brennan constitutional project: 
American legal education’s ambitious experiment in democratic constitutional-
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as sites in which legal elites have the resources to monitor the democratic 
failures even in Western countries,63 or they can train the students and the 
future elites committed to advancement of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System.64
Beyond the current debate spurred by the crisis, in U.S. legal education, 
the consequences on law schools are severe and the curricular changes 
or the lack of funding have impacted primarily the interdisciplinary and 
global approach promoted by legal academia. With the increasing com-
petition from Europe, China, Brazil and India offering competitive and 
often less costly legal education, U.S. law schools are challenged to reform 
and rethink their curriculum for global elites.65 For instance, the EU was 
spurred by economic and legal integration to rethink and reform; various 
EU soft and hard law initiatives are creating dynamic and competitive law 
schools aiming at creating a transnational legal elite of lawyers.66
C. U.S. Legal Education Reproducing Legal Elites Abroad
It is no longer clear whether the production of transnational legal elites 
will continue taking place in U.S. law schools through their pricy graduate 
programs offering skills tailored to local rather than global legal practice. 
For instance, the average cost of a graduate EU degree is $16 000 for an 
LL.M. degree, against the $50 000 average in the U.S., and there are at the
moment 173 E.U. programs offering such degrees. Since 2003, in Europe
there have been at least 36 new international LL.M. programs established
in 27 different law schools in Europe.67 In addition, issues of prestige
are at stake when the perception of the Parisian Bar is that those who
skipped the École du Barreau and circumvented the local exam to pass the
New York Bar took a shortcut trying to circumvent the more demanding
French Bar passage regime. Before taking the allegedly “easier” route
63 Kim Lane Scheppele (2016), “Enforcing the basic principles of EU 
law through systemic infringement procedures”, in Carlos Closa and Dimitry 
Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
64 See Claudio Grossman (2009), “The inter-American system and its evolu-
tion”, Inter-Am. and Eur. Human Rts. J., 2, 49.
65 See Claudio Grossman (2010), “Raising the bar: US legal education in an 
international setting”, Harv. Int’L L. J., 32, 16, 17.
66 See Julian Lonbay (2012), “The changing regulatory environment affecting 
the education and training of Europe’s lawyers”, J. Legal Educ., 64, 479, 481.
67 See Memorandum from the Office of Global Opportunities for Rachel 
Gordon to the faculty of Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Eur. LL.M Programs (11 
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of finishing an undergraduate law degree in Europe or in Asia, and then 
getting an American LL.M., students should consider that the New York 
Bar is viewed as a shorter and less difficult route than the arduous one of 
going to Bar School and passing the Bar back at home. In both Asia and 
Europe, studying for the Bar or practicing before taking the Bar exams 
requires several years to prepare for and has a much lower passage rate 
than the New York Bar.
The shift in influence of U.S. legal education, as a mean of diffusion, 
has therefore affected law schools in the U.S. rather than abroad. In 
the United States, law schools are turning inwards, cutting the funding 
to teach international law courses for JD students in favor of “real” 
courses, i.e. private and transactional law, rather than public interna-
tional law which is perceived as impractical for obtaining a “real legal 
job” and as nurturing “unrealistic expectations.”68 The mode of diffu-
sion of U.S. legal education is therefore changing. Law schools that 
shape the consciousness of the students committed to social justice at 
home or abroad through a mix of pragmatic, analytical, and interdisci-
plinary training skills are being replaced by problem-solving programs 
narrowly committed to local transactional practice. With respect to the 
subject’s thoughts rather than comparative constitutional and global 
human rights classes, the external focus of U.S. legal education happens 
increasingly through the lens of NSL and U.S. foreign policy or foreign 
relations.
Even though it might become unattractive or too expensive to pursue 
legal education in the United States, the prestige of its pedagogy does not 
appear undermined. On the contrary, the use of the Socratic method in the 
classroom, the adoption of the Bluebook Law Review style and the shift 
from treatise to case method, are spreading throughout the Europe, Asia, 
and Latin America. Another example of the spreading of American style 
in judicial deliberations is the increasing use of dissenting and concurring 
opinions introduced by the European Court of Human Rights.69 The 
academic push towards introducing U.S. style dissenting and concurring 
opinions in the Court of Justice of the EU is justified to address a stifling 
and cryptic judicial reasoning, or to create more visibility in its human 
rights jurisprudence.70 Finally, the transplant of U.S. legal education 
68 See Eric A. Posner and Jack L. Goldsmith (2005), The Limits of International 
Law (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press).
69 Ugo Mattei (1993), “Why the wind changed: Intellectual leadership in 
western law”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 42 (1), 195–219.
70 See Grainne de Burca (2013), “After the EU Charter of Fundamental 
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abroad is facilitated by the fact that its legal elites speak the language that 
in turn contributes to the global norm-production of legal regimes.71
Questions remain as to which legal elites and which ends are served by 
the push towards U.S. style legal education. The increasing emergence 
of U.S.-style law schools created by non-U.S. academic institutions have 
become part of the U.S. legal discourse. However, there is little research on 
how U.S. legal education and legal style are advanced by non-U.S. academ-
ics or institutions that are located beyond U.S. borders. Americanization is 
not necessarily a neocolonial and imperial strategy, but it might serve local 
elites different purposes, often departing from the U.S. underlying goal.72
Yet the diffusion of U.S. legal education continues by other complex 
and indirect means, especially abroad where U.S. law schools in Asia, 
Europe, and Latin America are engaged in spreading legal education that 
is often underexplored.73 For instance, U.S. law schools have commit-
ted to transitional and global legal education with summer or semester 
programs abroad, trying to modernize and make more attractive their 
curriculum to law students. However, once explored more closely, such 
attempts come at a high cost because they consolidate a model that repro-
duces the power structures of the global political economy.74 Finally, the 
unintended consequences that academic globalization of U.S. education 
abroad encounters when going to authoritarian and non-democratic 
regimes can be seen in the case of the Yale University’s establishment of an 
undergraduate college in Singapore. There, limits on campus-free expres-
sion, freedom of assembly, and other civil and political rights affect Yale’s 
ability to deliver U.S.-style education.75 Similar issues were raised in the 
New York University Abu Dhabi campus in relation to discrimination of 
sexual orientation and the overall dilution of human rights standards.76
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The shift in modes of diffusion of U.S. legal education, namely the 
inward-looking business practice coupled by an understanding of inter-
national and comparative law through the national security lens will 
impact the consciousness of future transnational legal elites. The change 
in consciousness that U.S. law schools are witnessing is elucidated by two 
graduation speeches delivered at different times at American University, 
Washington College of Law. These two speeches reflect the change in the 
way our young graduates should perceive their future role as transnational 
legal elites distributing legal services.
In his graduation address at the Washington College of Law in 1986, 
Professor Duncan Kennedy began his commencement speech saying:
Try your best, oh graduating students of the WCL, to avoid doing harm 
with your lawyer skills. [. . .] If you — if most lawyers — took the choice of 
clients seriously according to the vacuous piety that you should avoid doing 
harm with your lawyer skills, it seems likely that some clients would have 
to pay more for less legal service, and other people would get more service 
for less money. Your moral intuitions would influence the distribution of 
legal talent, through the market, along with the buying power of clients. 
Would that be better or worse than the current situation? I think it would be 
better.77
Addressing the Washington College of Law in 2013, Harold Hongju Koh 
gave his graduation speech starting with his family story and in particular 
how his father was an ambassador for Korea in the U.S. Later in his life 
Koh found himself representing the U.S. at the UN and when an ambas-
sador from another country sits beside him and hears his story, he says 
these words that Koh proudly echoes:
So your father was an ambassador to the U.S. and in one generation you are 
an ambassador from the U.S. America is the only country where that could 
happen, that is why you are the greatest nation. It is not your weapons, it is not 
your money, he said, it is your openness, your diversity, your commitment to 
law and Human Rights that is the source of your leadership [. . .] A first dis-
tinctive feature global [. . .] (Y)ou must understand international law because 
you belong to the first genuinely global generation, unlike your parents, the 
defining image of your era is not a world divide by the Berlin Wall, it is a world 
 connected by world wide web [. . .].78
77 See Duncan Kennedy (1987), “The responsibility of lawyers for the justice 
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The moral position presented by Kennedy at the 1986 graduation was 
based on the premise that, even in an adversarial situation, when you are 
asked to represent a client you disapprove of, as a lawyer, you can make 
a choice based on the moral belief that you have a commitment towards 
yourself and the entire society not to take your client’s case when he is 
“using” his legal rights in a bad case.79 The idea is that lawyers have a 
conscience based on different political or moral beliefs and they can make 
bad or good choices to distribute legal privileges accordingly.
Almost twenty years later, Koh praises two important features of the 
Washington College of Law, namely its public interest commitment and 
how international law and human rights courses are a fundamental part of 
the law school’s curriculum. Today protecting our sovereignty, according 
to Koh, means engaging with the world through a framework of inter-
national law to promote the global public interest. Like Kennedy, Koh 
addressed the fact that a good lawyer is not just a counselor but they have 
a moral conscience that will prevent her from making bad choices based 
on her sense of justice. However, he goes further, explaining how in his 
career he has condemned torture as a human rights advocate but he has 
also legitimized the use of drones in war as a government lawyer, for which 
he has been harshly criticized.80 On this note he finished his speech with 
“you are entitled to speak your mind [and] so is everyone else[.] [A]ll you 
can do is work your hardest, do your best [. . .] all you can do is live your 
life with integrity[.] [I]f you do they should judge you fairly.”81
In both speeches there is the sense that the skills law schools impart to 
young lawyers should not take over their moral conscience when making 
their professional choices. In this respect, there is not much change in the 
message that U.S. legal education offers to its young practitioners. Both 
speakers address the notion of public interest that changes from housing 
and poverty law to human rights and NSL according to the historical 
period of their legal education. While Kennedy’s speech is geared toward 
incorporating social justice into professional choices or everyday lawyers, 
in Koh’s speech the global public interest is advanced through the prac-
tice of human rights and NSL. By comparing these graduation speeches, 
almost twenty years apart, we can appreciate how U.S. legal education 
has influenced and at the same time is becoming an integral part of a 
global legal consciousness in which ethical choices made by U.S. lawyers 
79 See Kennedy (n 77), at 1160.
80 David Cole (2013), “How we made killing easy”, The New York Review of 
Books blog, 6 February, available at: http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/
feb/06/drones-killing-made-easy/ (accessed 14 September 2017).
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bear consequences both for national and international settings. Yet the 
discourse on how U.S. legal thought is reproduced through these graduat-
ing lawyers has somehow changed in focusing on a different type of legal 
practice, from tort law addressing social injustice, to NSL posing very 
hard questions for lawyers that will inevitably affect a global audience.
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